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SPEECH  TO  THE  ASSOCIATION  OF  EUROPEAN  JOURNALISTS 
BY  THE  RIGHT  HON  ROY  JENKINS,  PRESIDENT  OF  THE 
COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
Rome,  24  October  1980 
THE  EUROPEAN  MONETARY  SYSTEM:  RECENT  EXPERIENCE 
AND  FUTURE  PROSPECTS 
Almost  to  the day three years  ago  I  made  a  speech in 
Florence.  I  then argued that the  time  had  come  for a 
new  push  towards  the monetary integration of the European 
Corrnnu.nity.  Reactions were mixed.  Many  were  sceptical. 
Some  were hostile.  I  was  described as  impractical and 
unrealistic.  "A Bridge  Too  Far" was  the title of the 
Economist  commentary.  I  am  glad to  say that in recognizing 
the  problems which  gave rise to my  speech,  the political 
leaders of the Community  soon  came  to take  a  different 
view.  Within nine months  the  European Council at  Bremen 
took the decision in principle to create the  European 
-·  Monetary  System;  another nine months  after that in March 
1979,  the System came  into operation. 
It has  now  been in existence for just over eighteen 
months.  This  may  be  a  short time.  But  I  think it is 
long  enough,  at least for  those who  have  been  involved 
in the System since it began,  to have  formed  some  impression 
about  how  it is working and which way it is going.  My 
purpose  today is to undertake  that preliminary stock-taking. 
I  do  not  intend to  go  over the arguments which  I 
set out at Florence  for  an eventual monetary union in 
Europe.  But  I  want  to underline that in my  judgment they 
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have  lost none  of their validity.  I  believe that monetary 
union favours  a  more efficient and  developed rationalization 
of industry and  commerce.  I  believe that there is solid 
advantage  in creating a  major new  international currency 
backed  by  the economic  spread and  strength of the  Community. 
I  believe that a  monetary union would help  produce  a  new 
era of price stability in Europe  and  achieve  a  decisive  break 
with our present  chronic inflationary disorders.  I 
believe that  a  monetary union would  help in coping with 
the  present  economic  recession and one  of its ugliest 
aspects,  unemployment.  I  believe it would  promote a more 
equitable distribution of economic welfare within the 
regions of the  Community  provided it were  supported  by  a 
properly balanced  Community  budget  and  a  greater transfer 
of resources  through the  Community  institutions.  Finally 
I  believe it would  promote that political development 
of our institutions which is our  common  European faith and 
objective. 
To  these ends  the  European Monetary System is an 
important means.  It represents  that indispensable 
practical beginning which  I  called for at Florence.  Today 
I  will start by  looking at the real  improvements  in our 
situation which have already been achieved.  Next  I  shall 
turn to its less  complete or satisfactory features. 
Finally I  shall suggest in broad  terms  and without  going 
into technical detail the direction in which  I  believe 
the  system should evolve in the  future. 
/'First 
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First then about  the  progress we  have made.  It is 
I  believe no  coincidence that the  exchange  rates  between  the 
currencies of the eight countries  ~y  p~ticipatmgin the  System 
have  been considerably more  stable than before it was 
set up.  I  add  that  they have also  been more  stable than 
the  exchange rates of such other international currencies 
as  the  US  dollar,  the yen and  the  Swiss  franc.  I  know 
that there have  been occasions when  Community  central  banks 
have  intervened in the  foreign exchange markets  to maintain 
exchange  rates within the limits prescribed in the  EMS; 
but stability has  been achieved without  those violent and 
disruptive speculative attacks  on this or that currency 
which have  occurred in the past.  Thus  the fears  of those 
who  prophesied that the  EMS  would  simply lead to a  new 
and different kind of exchange rate instability have  proved 
to  be  unfounded. 
Equally unfounded  have  proved the  fears  of those 
who  believed that return to a  system of fixed  but adjustable 
rates would  lead to rigidity and that the authorities would 
insist on defending exchange rates that were unrealistic. 
In my  opinion this was  never a  serious danger.  The  lessons 
of the  60s  and early  70s  have  been well  learned.  Under 
the new  System there were  two  small-scale realignments at 
the  end of last year.  In both cases  these  changes  were 
clearly justified by the underlying economic  circumstances 
of the countries  concerned.  They were  carried out prompt-
ly, without acrimony and without resulting disorder in the 
£oreign exchange markets. 
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I  add in passing that the  special arrangements which 
were  made  for  the Italian lire have  proved their worth. 
I  remember  that when  the  EMS  was  launched there were many 
who  professed scepticism about  the ability of the lire 
and  the deutschrnark  to live together within the  System 
for more  than a  few  months without  a  major realignment. 
In fact the wider margins  of fluctuation which the lire 
was  attributed within the  System as  a  temporary measure 
have worked well,  allowing a  gradual  exchange rate 
depreciation in orderly fashion over eighteen months 
without unduly heavy intervention by the  Bank  of Italy. 
This  has  been achieved in spite of Italy's relatively high 
rate of inflation, in spite of the conversion of a  balance of 
payments  surplus into a  deficit,  and in spite of the 
uncertainty caused  by political developments  in Rome. 
Exchange rate stability is not of course an end  in 
itself.  It is the result  - the  balance achieved  -
of the interaction of the underlying economic 
circumstances of the countries concerned.  But  firm 
official commitment  to a  measure of exchange rate stability 
can itself contribute towards  an  improvedeconomic 
.. .  , 
performance.  It would  be wrong  to  neglect  economic performance 
for the  sake of exchange rate stability;  but equally wrong 
to  neglect  exchange rate stability in the belief that 
it does  not affect economic  performance.  In my  view 
there is now  wider recognition in Europe,  especially in 
those  countries which have  suffered  from  the vicious 
/circle 
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circle of exchange rate depreciation and inflation 
in the past,of the contribution which a  stable exchange 
rate can make  towards  controlling inflation.  The  right 
balance of stable exchange rate and  internal economic 
policy now  seems  nearer achievement. 
In this respect the creation of what  has  been called 
the divergence indicator in the  EMS  has  proved useful.  It 
has acted as a  kind of early warning system to point the 
need  for corrective action before a  country's external 
situation has deteriorated too  far. 
Again  I  do  not believe it to  be  a  coincidence that 
since the  System carne  into operation there has  been better 
co-ordination and  cohesion in the economic  policies of 
participating governments.  All are now  going in the 
same  direction:  that is to say towards  restraint with 
priority given to control of inflation.  Likewise  the 
divergencies in national  balance of payments  have  become  less 
wide.  At  present  largely for  oil price reasons  both the Cormrunit:y 
as a whole  and almost all its individual members are running current 
account deficits;  but if the  Community  and its members face  a 
common  problem with regard to  the outside world,  they 
face  much  less of a  problem within and  between themselves. 
Less  good  has  been the continuing differences in 
the inflation rates of Community  countries.  Unless  these 
differences are reduced,  obviously the exchange rate stability  we 
have  enjoyed cannot be pennarently  sustained.  These differences 
reflect deep-seated differences in attitude towards  inflation 
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and unemployment  in participating countries and not  just 
to differences in the determination of governments  and 
central  banks  to pursue anti-inflationary policies. 
Hence  I  fear that in this area where we  face  a  psychological 
as much  as  an economic  and political problem,  we  shall 
need  time  and  patience as well as effort. 
Another area where results have  so far  been 
disappointing has  been our failure  to develop coherent 
policies  towards  currencies outside  the System.  In many 
ways  this is a  potential rather than a  current source of 
trouble.  Although there have  been  some  fairly large  swings 
in exchange rates  between the European Currency Unit  and 
the dollar  (and  even larger ones  between the  ECU  and  the 
yen),  they have not  in the last eighteen months  caused 
major difficulties for the  Community  or upset  exchange 
rate relationships within the  EMS.  This  is perhaps  due 
more  to accident than design.  The  deutschmark  has  recently 
been relatively weak  on foreign exchange markets,  largely 
as  a  result of Germany's  current account deficit.  But 
while  there has  been  switching out of deutschmarks  into 
dollars and other third currencies,  there has  been little 
switching out of deutschmarks  into other EMS  currencies. 
The  reason is,  I  think,  that in view of Germany's  low 
inflation rate and underlying economic  strength,  no  foreign 
exchange  operator seriously entertains  the prospect of 
a  deliberate deutschmark devaluation against  the other 
member  countries.  But if operators were  to start to  switch 
out of dollars into deutschmarks  again  (and this  could 
/easily .  1 
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easily happen)  the deutschmark would rise against  the 
dollar which could in turn lead to  a  scramble out of other 
Community  currencies into deutschmarks.  This  has  happened 
before and  could happen again.  If it did it would  put 
the current stability of exchange rates under strain. 
The  lesson for us is, I  believe,  that we  should  be  in a 
position to manage  the  ECU/dollar exchange rate in a 
co-ordinated fashion  so as  to avoid or at least minimize 
the  strains which might  otherwise arise.  It is in our power 
to do  so. 
While  on third cprrencies,  this is perhaps  the moment 
for me  to  say a  word or two  about sterling.  Altho~gh sterling 
is formally included in the European Monetary System,  it 
is an outsider so  far as  existing  exchange rate  ,< 
arrangements are concerned.  I  continue  to believe that this 
is a  great mistake,  both for  the  Community  and still more  so 
for  the United Kingdom.  If the British do  not  become 
full members  of the System,  if they do  not accept  the  same 
risks and responsibilities and enjoy the  same  advantages 
as  the other members,  then they must not  complain if 
the System evolves in a  fashion which does  not necessarily 
take account of the particular characteristics of sterling 
and  the particular underlying economic  circumstances  of 
the United Kingdom. 
I  know  that there can at times  be  a  conflict between 
adherence  to a  domestic monetary target and  the  observance 
of limits on exchange rate movements  with its effects on 
dOmestic money  supply.  There is more  than one  way  to 
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deal with the  impact  of unwanted  inflows  or outflows  of 
foreign currency.  In any  event  there is much  flexibility 
in the  exchange rate  system of the  EMS.  The  United 
Kingdom  could,  like Italy,  opt  temporarily for wider 
margins;  or if the inflow and outflow of foreign currency 
were  to  become  intolerably large, it could adjust its 
exchange rate within the System as other members  have  already 
done.  It is because of the existence of this safety valve 
that other countries have  found it possible to reconcile 
purs~it of their economic  and monetary objectives with 
full participation in the  exchange rate system.  There  is 
no  reason why  the United Kingdom  should not do  the  same. 
In my  judgment  the  benefits would  be  substantial.  Greater 
exchange rate stability would  be much  welcomed  by  British 
exporters,  and would  be  good  for  the British economy  as 
a  whole. 
The  EMS  is of course more  than an exchange rate system. 
There  are  two  features  to which th€  European Council  drew 
attention in December  1978  and  for which further development 
was  explicitly planned.  These are  the European  Currency 
Unit and  the European Monetary  Fund. 
The  ECU  is now  firmly established as  the unit in 
terms  of which  the official business of the  Community  is 
conducted.  Old  habits die hard  and people still refer 
to  the European Unit of Account.  But  th~s has  now  been 
superseded  by  the  ECU,  and  I  hope  that  the world will 
now  enter fully into our vocabulary.  It has  the  advantage 
DO~ only of being an acronym for  European Currency Unit 
/but 
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but also of recalling one of the ancient European units 
of currency. 
The  ECU  is now  used in all the Community's  internal 
finance,  accounting and statistical functions:  the  budget, 
the  Investment  Bank,  the  Development  Fund  and  the  Common 
Agricultural Policy.  Within the  EMS  it is the unit in which 
exchange  rates are expressed and it is a  reserve asset.  It 
may well be  that the  Community will shortly float  a  new  balance 
of payments  loan denominated in ECUs. 
The use of the  ECU  in the private sector has  begun.  :Many 
of the major European commercial  banks  now  accept current 
account deposits  in ECUs  and  some  have  granted credits 
in them.  The  Commission  holds  ECU  accounts  and  has  placed 
short-term paper denominated in ECU.  But  so  far  the 
scale of operations has  been small.  This  is something 
which must  be  left essentially to the market.  Financial 
enterprises and their clients cannot  be  compelled to 
substitute ECUs  for other instruments,  although they can 
be  encouraged so  to do,  and unnecessary obstacles  to the 
use of the  ECU  can and  should  be  removed. 
Within the realm of official use of the ECU,  it seems 
to me  that there are at least  two  things which need to 
be  done  and  could  be  done without delay.  The  first relates 
to  the role which  the European Council  declared at Brussels 
in 1978  that the  ECU  should have:  that is to say it should 
be  the centre of the European Monetary System.  Frankly 
that is not yet  the case.  But it should 
be.  The  intervention of Community  central  banks 
/in 
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in the foreign exchange market  continues to  be  predominantly 
in dollars.  There  has  indeed  been  some  increase in the 
use of Community  currencies  for intervention purposes, 
but  I  think it fair to  say that it is the  exception rather 
than the rule.  Then  there are limitations to  the 
acceptability of the  ECU.  At  present a  creditor central 
bank has  only to accept  repayment  of 50  per cent of its 
claims in ECU.  The  remainder can  be  settled by  the 
transfer of other reserve assets.  This  means  giving 
second class status to  the  ECU.  I  think this  should  be 
changed  forthwith. 
The  second  change which  I  believe necessary concerns 
the relationship between the  ECU  and  gold.  One  of the 
reasons why  certain central banks  originally insisted that 
limitations  should  be  imposed on their obligation to accept 
ECUs  in settlement was  that  they were afraid that  too 
many  ECUs  might  be  created,  and  that if there were  an 
open-ended  commitment  by creditors to accept  payment  in 
ECUs,  they could end up  by holding far more  than they 
wanted.  To  understand this difficulty we  have  to  look 
at the way  ECUs  are created.  They are a  counterpart  to 
the  twenty per cent of member  countries' dollar and  gold 
reserves which central  banks  are required to deposit 
with the  European Monetary  Co-operation Fund.  As  a  result 
the quantity of ECUs  which each receives is a  function 
of the  ECU/dollar rate and  the  ECU  price of gold.  The 
ECU/dollar rate has not  been  too unstable over recent 
months;,  but the price of gold has,  as  you all know,  been 
/extremely 
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extremely volatile.  When  the  EMS  came  into operation 
in March  1979,  the  free  market  price of gold  stood at 
US  $240  an ounce:  today it stands at about  $650  an 
ounce  having touched nearly  $850  an  ounce  early this year. 
This was  not of course foreseen when  the  EMS  was  set up 
and  some  revision of the rules is clearly necessary.  Unless 
such a  revision takes  place,  the quantity of ECUs  on the 
market will partly depend  on  the price of a  commodity which 
can oscillate wildly in response  to extraneous  and 
irrelevant factors.  In my  judgment we  should revise  the 
present rules in such a  fashion as  to ensure that  the 
quantity of ECUs  to  be  created over a  given period are 
based on an objective assessment of the  Community's  needs. 
In spite of these disabilities,  the  ECU  exists and 
is flourishing.  The  same  cannot  be  said for  the projected 
European Monetary Fund.  It is normal  that there  should 
be  divergencies of views  between member  countries about 
the  functions  of the Fund  and  the degree  of independence 
it should enjoy.  These  differences  have  their roots in 
the different economic  philosophies,  institutions,  and 
experience of the Member  States.  It would  be  premature  to 
claim that  the  European Monetary Fund  should spring into 
existence as  a  kind of central  bank  for  Europe.  On  the 
other side it would  be  a  wasted opportunity if it were  to 
be  no  more  than a  re-vamped version of the  European Monetary 
Co-operation Fund under a  grander name.  In my  view  the  new 
Fund  should  from  the  beginning have at least some  of the 
features  and  functions  of a  central  bank.  These  could  be 
developed  and  enlarged over time  in the light of experience. - 12  -
I  do  not wish to enter here  into a  technical debate 
about  the Fund  but  I  think it should have  the  following 
three main  functions.  First it should determine  the 
quantity of ECUs  to  be  issued and  control  the  timing of 
issue;  secondly it should have  the task of co-ordinating 
the monetary policies of individual Member  States;  and 
thirdly it should control intervention policies with regard 
to  third currencies.  Decisions  on these  and other matters 
should  go  before  the European Council next year.  Work 
is already in hand,  and  the  Commission is playing its due 
part in it through  such bodies  as  the Monetary  Committee. 
I  attach the highest importance to  the  fact  that the 
European Monetary System,with the  European Currency Unit and 
one  day the  European Monetary Fund, is a Community  institution, 
and  formspart  of the construction of the  Community  as  a 
whole. 
The  world  today  faces  an uncertain and  forbidding 
economic  future,  characterized by high inflation,  slow 
growth,  and  large payments  imbalances.  The  Community 
cannot of course  solve  these problems  by itself.  But 
the  Community  has  a  formidable weight  in the world  economy. 
We  account  for  a  third of the output of the  free world 
industrial countries,  more  than half of their exports  and 
about  two-thirds of their reserves.  We  therefore have 
not only the  power  to help in resolving the 
world's ills but also a  heavy responsibility  so  to do. 
By  creating greater financial  stability and  advancing 
the  economic  growth of the Europeen  economy,  the  European 
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Monetary  System represents  a  major contribution to  the 
better functioning of the world  economy  as  a  whole. 
I  end as  I  began.  The  Europe~n Monetary  System 
represents an indispensable practical beginning  towards 
the creation of that European monetary union which I 
continue to  believe  should  be  our aim.  We  have  come  a  long 
way  since  I  spoke at Florence in October 1977.  The 
difficulty now  is to maintain the  sense of priority which 
led to the decision of Bremen,  and not  to prevent day-to-day 
difficulties obscuring our more  distant objective.  I 
make  this  speech as  a  contribution  ~o that end. KOMMISSIONEN  FOR  DE  EUROP.IEISKE  F.IELLESSKABERS- KOMMISSION DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN-1 
COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  - COMII•USSION  OES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES  - IP(8Q)  255 
COMMISSIONE  DELLE  COMUNITA  EUROPEE  - COMMISSlE  VAN  DE  EUROPESE  GEMEENSCHAPPEN '-------------' 
••  ••••  ••  ••  •  •  •  •••••••••••••••  •••  ••  •  •  •••••••  •  •••  •  ••  •  •••  •••••••••••••••••  •  ••  •  •  • ••••  e  e  e  e  e  t  I  I  I  t  I  e ••••••  e  •  e  t  I  I  I  t  I  I  I  t  I  I  I  I  t  I  I  t  I  t  e  t  I  •  I  I  t  I  t  I  I  I  t  t  t  I  I  t  I  t  t  I  t  I  t  t  I  t  I  I  t  •  t  e  I  I  e  e  e  I  I  t 
•  •••  ••  •••  ••  •  •  ••  •  •••  •  ••  ••••  ••••••  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • •  •••  ••••••••••••••••  •  •  •  ••  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •••••••  • •  ••  •  •••••••••••••••  ••••  •  •  •  •  •  •••• •  • 
TALSMANDENS  GRUPPE 
SPRECHERGRUPPE 
SPOKESMAN'S  GROUP 
GROUPE  DU  PORTE-PAROLE 
GRUPPO  DEL  PORTAVOCE 
BUREAU  VAN  DE  WOORDVOERDER 
PRESSE-MEDDELELSE 
MITTEILUNG  AN  DIE  PRESSE 
PRESS-RELEASE 
INFORMATION  A  LA  PRESSE 
INFORMAZIONE  ALLA  STAMPA 
MEDEDELING  AAN  DE  PERS 
Brussels,  24  October  1980 
'l'f::;. 31 
EXTRACTS  FROM  SPEECH  BY  MR  ROY  JENKINS,  PRESIDENT  OF  ~~----.~-~ 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES,  TO  THE  7/~ 
ASSOCIATION  OF  EUROPEAN  JOURNALISTS,  ROME,  24  OCTOBER  198 
"THE  EUROPEAN  MONETARY  SYSTEM:  RECENT  EXPERIENCE  AND  FUTURE  PROSPECTS"  -·-------------
Almost  to  the  day  three  years  ago  I  made  a  speech  in  Florence.  I  then  argued 
that  the  time  had  come  for  a  new  push  towards  the monetary  integration of  the 
European  Community.  Within  nine  months  the  European  Council  at  Bremen  took  the 
decision  in  principle to  create  the  European  Monetary  System;  and  another  nine 
months  after that,  in  March  1979,the  system  came  into operation. 
In  my  judgment  the arguments  I  set out  at  Florence  have  lost  none  of  their 
validity.  I  believe that  monetary  union  favours  a  more  efficient and  developed 
rationalization of  industry  and  commerce;  would  help  produce  a  new  era  of  price 
stability  in  Europe  and  achieve  a  decisive  break  with  our  present  chronic 
inflationary disorders;  would  help  in  coping  with  the  present  econow.ic  recession 
and  one  of  its ugliest  aspects,  unemployment;  would  promote  a  more  equitable 
distribution of  economic  welfare  within  the  regions  of  the  Community  supported 
by  a  properly  balanced  Community  budget  and  a  greater transfer of  resources 
through  the  Community  institutions,  and  would  promote  that  political  development 
of  our  institutions  which  is our  common  European  faith  and  objective. 
To  these  ends  the  European  Monetary  System  is an  important  means  and  indispensable 
·practical  beginning.  Real  improvements  have  already  been  achieved. 
An  area  where  results  have  so  far  been  disappointing  has  been  our  failure  to 
develop  coherent  policies  towards  currencies  outside the  System.  We  should  be 
in  a  position  to manage  the  ECU/dollar -exchange  rate  in  a  co-ordinated  fashior, 
so  as  to  avoid  or  at  least  minimize  the  strains.  It  is  in  our  power  to  do  so. 
Another  disappointment  is  that  although  sterlirg is formally  included  in  the 
European  Monetary  System,  it is  an  outsider  so  far  as  existing  exchange  rate 
arrangements  are  concerned.  I  continue  to  believe  that  this  is a  great  mistake, 
both  for  the  Community  and  still more  so  for  the  United  Kingdom.  If the British 
do  not  become  full  members  of  the  System,  if they  do  not  accept  the  same  risks 
and  responsibilities  and  enjoy  the  same  advantages  as  the other  members,  then 
they  must  not  complain  if. the  System  evolves  in  a  fashion  which  does  not 
necessarily  take  account  of  the particular characteristics of  sterling and  the 
particular underlying  economic  circumstances  of the  United  Kingdom. 
There  is much  flexibility  in  the  exchange  rate  system  of  the  EMS.  Other  countries 
have  found  it possible to  reconcile  pursuit  of  their economic  and  monetary 
objectives  with  full  participation  in  the  exchange  rate  system.  There  is no 
reason  why  the  United  Kingdom  should  not  do  the  same.  Greater  exchange  rate 
stability would  be  much  welcomed  by  British exporters,  and  would  be  good  for  the 
British economy  as  a  whole. 
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There  are  two  features  of  the  EMS  for  which  further  development  was  explicitly 
planned.  These  are  the  European  Currency  Unit  and  the  European  Monetary  Fund. 
The  ECU  is  now  firmly  established as  the  unit  in  terms- of  which  the official 
business  of  the  Cdmmunity  is conducted.  Use  of the  ECU  in  the  private  sector 
has  begun.  But  so  far  the  scale of  operations  has  been  small.  This  is  some-
thing which  must  be  left essentially to the  market. 
Within  the  realm  of official  use  of  the  ECU,  it seems  to  me  that  there  are  at 
least  two  things  which  need  to be  done  without  delay.  First  it should  be  the 
centre of  the  European  Monetary  System.  The  intervention of  Community  central 
banks  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  continues  to be  predominantly  in  dollars. 
Then  there are  limitations to  the  acceptability of  the  ECU.  At  present  a 
creditor central  bank  has  only  to accept  repayment  of  50  per  cent  of  its claims 
in  ECU.  I  think  this should  be  changed  forthwith. 
The  second  change  which  I  believe  necessary  concerns  the  relationship  between 
the  ECU  and  gold.  The  price of gold  has  been  extremely  volatile since  the  EMS 
came  into operation.  This  was  not  of course  foreseen.  Unless  a  revision  takes 
place,  the  quantity of  ECUs  on  the market  will partly depend  on  the  price of  a 
commodity  which  can  oscillate wildly  in  response  to extraneous  and  irrelevant 
factors.  In  my  judgment  we  should  revise  the present  rules  in  such  a  fashion 
as  to ensure that  the  quantity of  ECUs  to be  created over a  given  period  is 
based  on  a  objective assessment  of  the  Community's  needs. 
In  spite of  these disabilities,  the  ECU  exists  and  is flourishing.  The  same 
cannot  be  said for  the projected European  Monetary  Fund.  It  would  be  premature 
to  claim  that  the European  Monetary  Fund  should  spring  into existence  as  a  kind 
of  central bank  for  Europe.  On  the  other side it would  be  a  wasted  opportunity 
if it were  to be  no  more  than  a  re-vamped  version of the  European  Monetary  Co-
operation  Fund  under  a  grander  name.  In  my  view  the  new  Fund  should  from  the 
beginning  have  at  least  some  of  the  features  and  functions  of  a  central  bank. 
First  it should  determine  the  quantity of  ECUs  to be  issued  and  control  the 
timing  of  issue;  secondly  it should  have  the  task  of  co-ordinating  the  monetary 
policies of  individual  Member  States;  and  thirdly it should  control  intervention 
policies  with  regard  to third currencies.  Decisions  on  these  and  other matters 
should  go  before  the  European  Council  next  year. 
The  question  now  is to maintain  the  sense  of priority which  led  to the  decision 
of  Bremen  in  1978,  and  not  to prevent  day-to-day difficulties obscuring our  more 
distant objective. 